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 Are Delusions Bad for You? 
Lisa Bortolotti argues that there is more to judging delusions than 
whether they accurately reflect the world 
The ethics of belief concerns the study of those rules or guidelines (‘norms’) that apply to 
people adopting or maintaining beliefs—that is, the ethics of our epistemic behaviour. For 
instance, many think that the fundamental norm is not to believe something for which 
there is no sufficient evidence. In that context, we can ask whether someone is 
responsible for forming a belief for which she does not have sufficient evidence, and 
whether she should be blamed for it. This is a deontological approach to the ethics of 
belief. 
Alternatively, the fundamental norm could be to maximize epistemic value when adopting 
new beliefs, where epistemic value can be thought of in terms of the ratio of true to false 
beliefs, epistemic utility (how useful the belief is), or epistemic virtue (to what extent 
agents exhibit good character, for instance, intellectual honesty or humility). Then, we 
would focus on the consequences of an agent adopting certain beliefs or following 
certain rules for the adoption of beliefs. This is a consequentialist approach to the ethics 
of belief. 
Our suggestion is that no matter which approach we choose, it is not obvious that 
delusions are ethically problematic beliefs. The term ‘delusion’ refers to a clinical 
phenomenon, and in particular to a symptom of schizophrenia, delusional disorders, 
dementia, amnesia, and other psychiatric disorders. In the most recent version of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (commonly referred to as the 
DSM-5), delusion is defined as a false belief that is firmly held despite what almost 
everyone else believes, and despite what constitutes obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary. The definition has been challenged on various grounds, but it remains a useful 
diagnostic tool for clinicians. 
Examples of delusions are persecution, where the person reports that other people are 
hostile and intend to cause her harm, and jealousy, where the person reports that her 
romantic partner is being unfaithful to her. More bizarre delusions include mirrored-self 
misidentification, where the person reports that there is a stranger in the mirror, or the 
Cotard delusion, where the person reports that she is dead or disembodied. 
Why do we claim that people should not be held responsible or blameworthy for having 
delusions? First, in the context in which delusions are formed, people’s ability to believe 
otherwise is significantly compromised due to reasoning impairments, biases, and 
motivational factors. For instance, people with delusions tend to jump to conclusions, 
coming to a set judgement about the likelihood of an event without having considered 
carefully the evidence at their disposal. From a deontological point of view, impairments, 
biases, and motivational factors prevent such people from adopting an alternative belief 
to the delusional one, and from recognizing the epistemic shortcomings of their 
delusions. 
Second, delusions have obvious epistemic faults, being often wildly implausible and 
irresponsive to counter-evidence. But some delusions enable agents to manage negative 
feelings that could become overwhelming and provide an explanation for anomalous 
hypersalient experience, putting an end to a state of anxious expectation that 
undermines attention and concentration. Some also argue that delusions can help people 
resume learning that was previously disrupted by the effects of anomalous experience on 
their model of the world. As counterintuitive as it may sound, the adoption of a delusional 
hypothesis may help avoid bad epistemic consequences and it can enable people to 
engage with the physical and social environment surrounding them at a critical time. 
Delusions can be an example of epistemically innocent cognitions. If at the time of the 
person adopting the delusional beliefs, the delusion prevents a serious epistemic harm 
from occurring, and no alternative beliefs are available to the person, then such 
delusions are not ethically problematic and what we have is a case of epistemic 
innocence. 
The notion of epistemic innocence can make a number of positive contributions to the 
general debate on the ethics of belief: it points to the fact that the scope of epistemic 
evaluation is wider than the enterprise of establishing whether a belief is justified by 
evidence; it forges connections between deontological and consequentialist approaches 
to the ethics of belief; and it emphasizes the need to take into account contextual factors 
in the practice of belief evaluation. 
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